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There is compelling evidence to support the widely held view among observers of Africa’s 
development that the continent’s 
performance in delivering its regional 
transport infrastructure programmes is 
inadequate. For instance, the Trans-
African Highways (TAH) network that 
was conceived in the early 1970s 
to link countries on the continent is 
still incomplete, with missing links 
constituting more than 20 percent of 
the 57,300 km network.1 Similarly, only 
16 out of 103 projects (15.3 percent) of 
the NEPAD Infrastructure Short Term 
Action Plan were completed. 
The huge gap between Africa’s 
regional infrastructure policy and 
practice is attributed to several factors, 
including: 
• weak political will and lack of 
ownership of projects; 
• political instability and insecurity; 
inadequate finance, technical 
capacity and institutional 
framework; 
• variations in national policies, laws 
and regulations on investment in 
infrastructure; 
• difficult natural settings; as well as 
• low demand, lack of interest, and 
conflicting priorities. 
This demonstrates the multi-
dimensional nature of the hurdles to 
the implementation of Africa’s regional 
infrastructure programmes.
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The primary objective of these 
programmes is to deepen regional 
integration on the continent. 
Specifically, they aim among other 
things to provide direct road links 
between Africa’s capital cities; 
contribute to the political, economic 
and social integration and cohesion 
of the continent; and ensure road 
transport facilities between important 
areas of production and consumption. 
It is also expected that improved 
regional infrastructure will enable 
the full realisation of the benefits 
of the Continental Free Trade Area 
(CFTA), whose negotiation is ongoing, 
notably in terms of increased intra-
African trade. The slow pace of 
implementation of Africa’s cross-
border infrastructure projects should 
be a major preoccupation of the 
continent’s political leaders, policy 
makers and other stakeholders because 
it may compromise Africa’s regional 
integration, industrialisation and 
structural transformation agenda. 
The current approach to managing 
Africa’s regional transport infrastructure 
programmes does not sufficiently 
emphasise the importance of national 
ownership of regional projects although 
this is critical to the implementation 
of the projects. The purpose of this 
article is to analyse the sluggish 
implementation of Africa’s cross-
border transport infrastructure projects 
through a lens of national ownership. 
The article explores the factors that 
underlie national ownership of regional 
projects, with particular emphasis on 
the linkages between ownership and 
performance. 
The extent to which political will 
and national ownership of regional 
programmes exist in Africa is a 
contentious issue. Some observers 
argue that the endorsement of regional 
programmes, such as the Programme 
for Infrastructure Development in Africa 
(PIDA), by political leaders, often at the 
level of Heads of State, demonstrate 
high-level political will. They contend 
that it is up to technical experts to 
translate the vision expounded in such 
programmes into action. Proponents of 
this view also allude to efforts made by 
the main promoters of the programmes 
– African Union Commission (AUC), 
NEPAD Planning and Coordinating 
Agency (NPCA), African Development 
Bank (AfDB) and the Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) – to ensure 
the buy-in and ownership of projects at 
the national level. Such efforts include 
the involvement of member States 
and RECs in the process of developing 
the programmes, particularly in the 
selection of projects. 
Those who argue that political will 
and ownership of regional programmes 
is lacking at the national level point to 
the limited extent to which regional 
projects are placed in national 
programming documents. They stress 
that African countries are not steadfast 
in their pursuit of the implementation 
of regional projects and that their effort 
to assure the timely delivery of these 
projects is dismal, if not completely 
non-existent. They draw attention to 
the absence of budgets that reconcile 
specific regional projects to available 
financial resources. Moreover, many 
experts at the national level are not 
familiar with regional programmes. 
This, in the view of some observers, 
suggests that countries may simply be 
paying lip service to the programmes. 
There is also scepticism about the 
level of participation of countries in 
the process of developing regional 
programmes. In this regard, the quality 
of participation of countries in the 
design of programmes is deemed to be 
inadequate, as reflected by the level of 
representation at strategy analysis and 
formulation meetings – often attended 
by staff with limited responsibility and 
authority. 
In light of the above conflicting 
views, what would it take for countries 
to own regional projects and how would 
that impact on the implementation 
of the projects? In other words, to 
what extent do African countries own 
regional projects? Why should national 
ownership be an issue for projects 
that are already endorsed by Heads of 
State? What needs to be done for the 
implementation of regional projects to 
become an issue at the national level? 
In establishing what the answers to 
these questions might be, the analysis 
that follows is a synthesis of empirical 
findings from case studies of selected 
regional transport infrastructure 
programmes in Africa.2 
institutional Landscape for Regional 
infrastructure Development in Africa
There are three major groups of 
actors in Africa’s regional infrastructure 
programmes, namely the continent’s 
regional organisations – particularly 
AUC, NPCA, AfDB, ECA and RECs; 
member States; and development 
partners. The private sector and civil 
society organisations are also involved, 
but to a limited extent. Partnership is 
the main strategy to implement these 
programmes and there are two main 
dimensions in this regard. The first is 
partnership among African regional 
organisations and countries and the 
second is partnership between African 
organisations and countries on the 
one hand and development partners 
on the other. Shared ownership 
is well established as an essential 
ingredient of effective partnerships, 
which underscores the importance 
of African countries to own the 
continent’s regional programmes, 
together with regional organisations. In 
this context, reference to ownership of 
regional programmes revolves mostly 
around funding and strategic decision 
making related to the planning and 
implementation of their projects. 
Regional organisations, with the 
financial and technical support of 
development partners, spearhead 
the implementation of regional 
programmes. The Economic 
Community for West Africa States 
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(ECOWAS), for instance, has created a 
Project Preparation and Development 
Unit (PPDU) while a Project 
Preparation and Implementation 
Unit (PPIU), housed at the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), was created for the North-
South Corridor Programme that links 
a number of sea ports and hinterlands 
in Southern and Eastern Africa. The 
extent of the involvement of member 
States varies across programmes and 
they are part of steering and technical 
committees, among other mechanisms, 
created to facilitate the implementation 
of the programmes. Generally, 
however, these committees meet 
irregularly. Member States are also 
supposed to nominate national focal 
points for the different programmes 
but many of them fail to do so. This 
is particularly the case for the Central 
African Transport Master Plan where 
various structures created by Heads 
of State for its implementation are 
dysfunctional.
Recently, intergovernmental 
agreements for the implementation 
of regional programmes have been 
signed at the highest political level. 
For instance, the Treaty on the 
establishment of the Abidjan-Lagos 
Corridor was signed by the Heads of 
State of Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, 
Benin and Nigeria in March 2014. 
However, key provisions of the Treaty 
such as the establishment of the 
Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Management 
Authority and the creation of a Seed 
Fund have not been implemented. 
Similarly, the intergovernmental 
agreement on the Trans-African 
Highways was endorsed by African 
Heads of States and Government in 
June 2014 but will only enter into force 
after ratification by 15 AU member 
States, which is not yet the case.
The Institutional Architecture for 
Infrastructure Development in Africa 
(IAIDA) attempts to provide a clear 
picture of where each of the numerous 
actors fit in the complex decision making 
and implementation process of Africa’s 
regional infrastructure programmes. 
IAIDA articulates the different stages 
and institutions involved in the 
decision making and implementation 
of infrastructure programmes in Africa. 
There are three main challenges in 
operationalising IAIDA. First, the roles 
and responsibilities of the various 
actors have to be clearly defined –
which is currently being done through 
the development of a manual for 
the Programme for Infrastructure 
Development in Africa (PIDA). 
Second, all concerned institutions 
have to be aware of and agree with 
the roles and responsibilities assigned 
to them, which is critical for collective 
ownership of IAIDA. Third, these 
institutions, especially AUC, NPCA, 
RECs, and member States need to have 
the political will, capacity, and financial 
resources required to fulfil their roles 
and responsibilities in IAIDA.
In terms of structures to fund 
regional projects, NPCA has created 
the Service Delivery Mechanism 
(SDM) which is a funding mechanism 
to support activities at the early stages 
in the preparation of projects and to 
complement the NEPAD Infrastructure 
Project Preparation Facility (IPPF) 
housed at AfDB. It is worth mentioning 
that AfDB has also launched a fund 
of US$ 100 billion for financing 
infrastructure projects in Africa – the 
Africa50 Fund. It is envisaged that 
the Fund will help finance AU’s 
Agenda 2063.
Concerning the private sector, NPCA 
spearheads the Continental Business 
Network (CBN) which was established 
to address the lack of involvement 
of the private sector in PIDA and to 
complement other platforms such 
as the NEPAD Business Foundation 
(NBF). However, the private sector 
is generally not interested in projects 
that are not bankable. Therefore, 
engagement with actors in the sector 
should focus on projects that are fully 
prepared or in an advanced stage of 
preparation. To this end, President 
Macky Sall of Senegal convened the 
Dakar Financing Summit in June 2014, 
aimed at building and strengthening 
innovative synergies between the 
public and private sector towards 
mobilising financial investments for 
infrastructure development in Africa. 
Civil society organisations increasingly 
want to be involved in decision making 
on Africa’s regional infrastructure 
projects. However, they are not 
necessarily supportive of these projects. 
Some of them question the objectives, 
selection criteria, and impact of the 
projects, especially in the context of 
poverty reduction and benefits to 
local communities. Mega projects are 
being subjected to intense scrutiny 
because of the perception by some 
sections of the civil society that such 
projects are beneficial to big business 
corporations and not necessarily the 
local community.
Development partners play a 
dominant role in the implementation 
of Africa’s regional infrastructure 
programmes. The North-South Corridor 
Programme is a good example of the 
deep involvement of development 
partners in these programmes. The 
United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) 
supported the Programme through 
Trade Mark Southern Africa (TMSA), 
one of its programmes in the region 
designed for a period of 5 years with a 
budget of £100 million. In December 
2013, the UK’s Secretary of State for 
International Development announced 
the early closure of TMSA following 
a review by the UK’s Independent 
Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI). As 
a result, approximately £42 million 
of uncommitted funds was reclaimed 
by the UK Government. Indeed, 
those who had questioned the 
sustainability of programmes that hinge 
on the financial support of donors 
felt vindicated when these funds 
were reclaimed. Some experts and 
observers, particularly in South Africa, 
had expressed the view that DFID 
through TMSA, had entrenched itself 
in the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite 
and effectively took ownership of 
the development of regional roads in 
Southern Africa, notably those of the 
North-South Corridor.
China is significantly involved in 
Africa’s cross-border infrastructure 
projects. For instance, it constructed 
the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway and is 
involved in the Nairobi-Mombasa 
railway which is under construction 
and is envisaged to be extended 
to Uganda and Rwanda. China has 
also announced that it would assist 
Africa in building a high-speed 
railway network, an initiative that 
is a flagship project of AU’s Agenda 
2063. While this project could close 
Africa’s infrastructure gap and enhance 
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its economic development, many 
wonder if the continent is drifting with 
the tide and allowing others to make 
important decisions on its behalf, in 
terms of which projects should be 
prioritised, when and how they should 
be implemented and by whom. This is 
the core of the debate on ownership 
of Africa’s infrastructure projects. Both 
enthusiasts and bashers of China would 
agree that it is a valid concern.
Considerable effort, mostly 
spearheaded by regional organisations, 
has been made to set up structures 
to facilitate the implementation of 
Africa’s cross-border infrastructure 
programmes, and multiple actors – 
with different interests, values, power 
and knowledge – are involved in the 
implementation of these programmes. 
While regional organisations play a 
prominent role, their actions are limited 
by their mandates and capacity and are 
unlikely to lead to significant progress 
of projects without the ownership of 
the projects by member States. 
Prioritising regional projects at the 
national level
The main proposition of this article 
is that African governments do not 
pay sufficient attention to regional 
infrastructure programmes because 
they are not necessarily their priority. 
They generally do not initiate the 
programmes; are not represented 
appropriately in selecting projects; 
and do not necessarily accept that 
the choice of projects is based on a 
balanced consideration and analysis 
of the costs and benefits of different 
options. Moreover, few member States 
mobilise stakeholders, make public 
commitment and allocate resources 
to the programmes. In addition, new 
governments on the continent do not 
necessarily pursue the policies of their 
predecessors.
Agenda-setting theory offers 
useful insights into the persistent lack 
of political will to domesticate and 
implement regional infrastructure 
projects in Africa. According to the 
theory, the interaction between 
preferences, information and 
institutions generate policy attention, 
in this case, related to placing regional 
projects in national programming 
documents. Regarding preferences 
in relation to transport infrastructure 
development, politicians tend to prefer 
national rather than regional projects; 
and short term rather than long-term 
projects to enhance their chances 
of being associated with successful 
projects. This is because national 
projects that could be completed 
within a short period of time are more 
visible and can be identified with the 
immediate needs of the population 
as opposed to regional projects 
that are more complex and require 
longer periods to be completed. The 
general perception is that costs are 
lower and benefits are more obvious 
for national projects compared to 
regional ones. Strong governance 
institutions, including parliaments, 
government departments and state-
owned enterprises can help to ensure 
that infrastructure policy, funding 
and implementation follow a longer 
term strategy driven by critical need 
rather than political imperative. Strong 
institutions also ensure that long term 
infrastructure projects stay on track, 
even when political power in a country 
changes hands. 
Overall, it is helpful when there is a 
connection between a regional project 
and a country’s vision of economic 
growth and development. A project 
is more likely to be prioritised if it 
contributes to the achievement of a 
regional vision that is aligned to national 
vision. It appears that significant effort 
is not being made to establish linkages 
between regional projects and national 
visions as articulated in national 
development strategies.
In terms of information, the second 
component of the agenda-setting 
theory, the importance of an informed 
public and policy makers to policy 
change cannot be overemphasised. 
In the context of Africa’s regional 
transport infrastructure programmes, 
the information required to attract 
attention and stimulate policy change 
– from ignoring or paying lip service 
to placing these programmes on the 
national agenda – could be related 
to the problems that they seek to 
solve and their solutions as well as 
the costs and benefits of the 
programmes. 
For instance, information and data 
on the quantity and condition of 
existing infrastructure assets, the 
future demand and supply mismatch 
and estimates of potential economic 
and social benefits could trigger 
policy change. A key message that 
could be targeted at the public 
and national policy makers is that 
physical connectivity is an integral 
part of regional integration and that 
the benefits of regional integration, 
particularly increased intra-African 
trade, would be compromised by 
inadequate cross-border infrastructure. 
Similarly, there is empirical evidence 
that improving Africa’s cross-border 
infrastructure would support the 
full realisation of the benefits of the 
Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). 
Given time, cost and expertise 
limits, a disciplined process is required 
to determine the projects with the 
potential to most efficiently yield 
economic and social benefits for 
countries. Policy makers need to be 
sufficiently informed to make this 
decision. The key question is whether 
the information provided to them is 
picked up or ignored and this would 
depend on the strength of the case 
that is made for the implementation of 
regional infrastructure projects. 
Regarding institutions, the third 
component of the agenda-setting 
theory, actors may prefer to devote 
attention to certain issues and have 
the necessary information to do so, 
but they may not act because they are 
constrained by various rules that must 
be satisfied before being able to devote 
attention to an issue, or because 
of capacity limitations. This may 
explain why the NEPAD Presidential 
Infrastructure Champion Initiative 
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(PICI) projects, for example, still 
experience delays although they have 
high-level political champions. In this 
case, PICI projects are political priorities 
and political leaders have access to all 
the necessary information about the 
projects but institutional issues, such 
as government ineffectiveness, may 
hamper their implementation.
Overall, the ingredients to influence 
policy change with respect to Africa’s 
regional transport infrastructure 
development are generally known. 
These include the preferences of 
politicians; relevant information on 
the challenges and solutions to the 
implementation of regional projects 
as well as their benefits; and the state 
of African institutions, particularly 
capacity and governance challenges. 
Placing regional projects on the 
national agenda is the core of creating 
an enabling environment because 
these projects only kick-off after they 
get the attention of national politicians 
and policy makers. Without national 
buy-in, the projects remain regional 
dreams with shaky foundations – not 
deeply rooted at the national level 
– and therefore have slim chances of 
being implemented. 
Some regional projects have made 
progress under the leadership of RECs 
that have mobilised funds particularly 
to undertake feasibility studies. But 
doing the feasibility study for a project 
does not necessarily mean that it 
is a national priority, particularly 
when such studies are not funded by 
countries themselves. That may even 
reinforce the belief by most national 
stakeholders that regional organisations 
are responsible for implementing 
regional projects. Member states are 
not opposed to regional organisations 
being responsible for implementing 
projects, if the projects are not 
perceived to be against national 
interest, mostly because it takes away 
the burden of implementation from 
them. The fundamental problem 
with this approach is that regional 
organisations are not well equipped to 
implement projects, in terms of their 
mandate as well as human and financial 
capacity. They have, therefore, fallen 
short whenever they have tried to 
play the role of implementers, with 
the limited success recorded being at 
the preparatory stages of the project 
development cycle.
The limitation of the model of 
implementing regional programmes, 
where regional organisations take 
the lead and member states play 
a passive role, has been exposed 
to be inappropriate by the slow 
pace of implementation of existing 
programmes. To reverse this situation, 
member states should take full 
ownership of projects with regional 
organisations playing a coordinating 
and facilitation role. For this to happen, 
member states should be fully involved 
in decision-making on regional projects 
which should be integrated into 
national plans and be assigned budgets. 
Conclusion
Partnership is the main strategy 
to implement Africa’s regional 
infrastructure programmes and shared 
ownership is a core attribute of 
successful partnerships. While regional 
organisations, with the support of 
donors, spearhead the implementation 
of these programmes, most member 
States rarely demonstrate the attributes 
that one would expect of owners of the 
programmes. 
Prioritising the projects of Africa’s 
regional programmes at the national 
level is therefore a critical missing 
link in the implementation of these 
projects. Closing this gap requires an 
understanding of national preferences 
and aligning the projects to them; 
communicating the business case, 
particularly the benefits of the projects 
to the public and policy makers; and 
factoring time and resource constraints 
at the national level when introducing 
regional projects. It is when regional 
projects are treated as national 
priorities that the scale of government 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness to 
implement them could be objectively 
and thoroughly assessed. This in turn 
will place efforts to build capacity and 
mobilise financial resources in proper 
context. For instance, projects that are 
part of national plans are more likely 
to be funded by financial institutions 
and investors than those that are 
not, because this indicates long term 
commitment of countries to projects. 
Regional organisations are playing 
a commendable role in spearheading 
the implementation of cross-border 
projects but their actions are limited by 
their mandates as well as human and 
financial capacity. These actions hover 
around the preparation of projects 
and are unlikely to lead to a significant 
level of delivery of projects. They 
should therefore focus their attention 
on mainstreaming regional projects 
in national development plans. This 
is more likely to happen if their 
performance is measured by the extent 
to which they influence the integration 
of such projects in national plans. ■
Endnotes
1 AfDB, ECA, Review of the Implementation status of the 
trans-African highways and the missing links  Vol. 1: 
Main Report, Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, ADB, 2003.
2 The case studies were part of research undertaken 
by the author to obtain a doctorate degree at the 
Maastricht School of Management. The cases include 
the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Highway Development 
Programme; Central African Transport Master Plan; 
and North-South Corridor Programme. The Abidjan-
Lagos Corridor covers a distance of 1,028 km and 
connects the West African cities of Abidjan, Accra, 
Cotonou, Lome and Lagos. The Programme consists 
of modernising and upgrading the Corridor by 
constructing 4 One-Stop-Border Posts (OSBPs); and a 
6-lane (2x3) dual carriage highway with provision for 
rail and fibre optics. The Central African Master Plan 
is a programme that addresses the collective transport 
infrastructure needs of the sub-region and covers all 
transport modes – road, rail, air, maritime and inland 
waterways. An objective of the Action Plan is to link 
Central African capital cities with paved roads. The 
inter-state capital links have a total length of 14,240 
km and involves the following countries Angola, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Equatorial 
Guinea and Chad. The North-South Corridor 
Programme was launched by the COMESA-EAC-SADC 
Tripartite platform as a pilot Aid-for-Trade Programme 
in Lusaka, Zambia in 2009.  It spans across 8 countries 
(Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe) and has a total length of 10,647 km. The 
Programme consists of upgrading, rehabilitating and 
maintaining roads on the Corridor.
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